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522 MAGILL BROS.

V.

BLDG. SERVICE ETC. UNION

[20 C. (2d)

ment in the cases of McKay v. Retail Auto. S. L. Union No.
106'7, 16 Cal. (2d) 311 [106 P. (2d) 373] j and Steiner v.
Long Beach Local No. 128, 19 Cal. (2d) 676 [123 P. (2d)
20], that pickets must act honestly is dictum, and no consideration is given therein to the effect of such statement on
the right of freedom of speech in relation thereto. The same
is true of Euclid Candy Co. v. International Longshoremen,
49 Cal. App. (2d) 137 [121 P. (2d) 91]; Davitt v. American
Bakers' Union, 124 Cal. 99 [56 Pac. 775]. The same bald
statement alone is made in Weist v. Dirks, 215 Ind. 568 [20
N. E. (2d) 969]; Wiltner v. Bless, 243 N. Y. 544 [154N. ,E.
598] j Olympia Operating Co. v. Costello, 278 Mass. 125 [i79
N. E. 804] j and no discussion appears with reference to freedom of speech in any of these cases.
Because of my strong conviction that the preservation of
the fundamental civil liberties of free speech, free press and
free assembly is essential to the perpetuation of our democratic institutions, I view with alarm every encroachment
against the exercise of these rights, whether such encroachment is directed against organized labor or other minority
groups. If these·rights can be abridged under the guise that
what is said or published is false, it will just be a matter of
time until freedom of expression will be curtailed in accordance with the will of the dominant group, who by providing
the standard as to what constitutes truth or falsity can control publications of any character whether they be by word
of mouth, placard, banner or what we now designate as a
newspaper.
Furthermore, I am positively and unalterably against any
form of discrimination in permitting the exercise of the fundamental personal rights guaranteed by our federal and state
Constitutions. These rights are not only guaranteed to those
who have sufficient power and influence to enforce their recognition, but like the air and the sunshine their beneficent
attributes should be shared and enjoyed by the weak and
humble and those who are struggling for their very existence.
I can see no reason whatever why publication of a false
statement by a labor organization concerning the facts of a
labor dispute should be subject to abatement by an injunction
while a newspaper is privileged to publish false statements
and be subject only to the redress afforded to those who claim
that they have been libeled by such publication, namely, an
action at law for damages.
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In my opinion, the judgment in the case at bar should be
affirmed.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied July 29,
1942. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

[Sac. No. 5433.

In Bank.

July 9, 1942.]

MRS. BEN WHITLOW, as Executrix; etc., Respondent, v.
CARRIE E. DURST, Appellant.
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD EMPLOYES' MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION (a
Corporation), Plaintiff, v. CARRIE E. DURST, Appellant; MRS. BEN WHITLOW, as Executrix, etc.,Respondent.
[la, lb] Divorce-Separation Agreements-Termination-Recon~
cilia1:ion-Evidence.-The intention of the parties.is a material element in determining whether there has been a recon,,'ciliation between husband and wife. And upon that issue it
is proper to admit testimony that shortly after the alleged
reconciliation the husband, since deceased, declared that he
and his wife were still separated and would never be reconciled.
[2] Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations as to Intention.-When intent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of
a decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that
indicate the intent with whichhe performed the act are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule,
irrespective of whether the declarations are self-serving.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Siskiyou County. Herbert S. Gahs, Judge assigned. Affirmed-.
Actions involving two life insurance policies, one by the
executrix of the estate of the insured to recover the proceeds
of a policy paid to his widow, and the other an interpleader
action by an insurer against the executrix and the widow.
Judgment for executrix affirmed.
[2] See 10 Cal. Jur. 1073, 1102.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce and Separation, § 313;
[2] Evidence, ~ 264,
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J. Everett Barr, Tebbe & Correia, Samuel Freidman and
J. P. Correia for Appellant.
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Carter, Barrett & Carlton, Oliver J. Carter and Daniel S.
Carlton for Respondent.

1:,[

TRAYNOR, J.-In July, 1938, Charles and Carrie Durst
separated and executed a property settlement under which
she transferred to him her interest in two insurance policies
upon his life. He died a month later leaving a will bequeathing the proceeds of the policies to his sister and executrix in
trust for his mother.
.
'j
Two actions were brought on the policies. In the first the
executrix seeks to recover from Mrs. Durst the proceeds of
one policy paid to her by the insurer. The second is brought
by the other insurer in interpleader, who paid the amount
of the policy into court. In both actions the executrix claims
the proceeds under the property settlement and decedent's
will. Mrs. Durst claims that the agreement was revoked by a
reconciliation with her husband on July 16, 1938, and that
decedent made a gift of the policies to her. While several ,vitnesses corroborated ber testimony that there had been a reconciliation, several other witnesses gave testimony indicating
that there had been no reconciliation, and her testimony was
the only evidence of a gift. The trial court r~solved the conflict in the evidence and found that there had been no gift
or reconciliation and entered judgment for the executrix.
Mrs. Durst appeals.
[la] There is ample evidence to support the findings of the
trial court, but appellant urges that the court erroneously admitted testimony that shortly after the alleged reconciliation
decedent declared that he and his wife were still separated
and would never be reconciled. It is argued that these statements were hearsay, self-serving because they were made
after the alleged reconciliation, and therefore incompetent
as evidence, and that their admission constituted prejudicial
error.
[2] When intent is a material element of a disputed fact,
declarations of a decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that indicate the intent with which he performed the
act are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule, and it is immaterial that such declarations are self-serving. Thus, in cases involving the delivery of deeds, declarations of the alleged grantor made before and after the mak-
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ing of the deed are admissible upon the issue of delivery, and
it is immaterial that such declarations. are in the interest of
the party producing them. (Williams ·v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631 ,
[151 Pac. 1, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 703] ; Donohue v. Sweeney,
171 Cal. 388 [153 Pac. 708] ; De Cou v. Howpll, 190 Cal. 741
[214 Pac. 444] ; See, McBaine, Admissibility in California of
Declarations of Physical or Mental Condition, 19 Cal. L. Rev;
231, 251). Likewise, in gift cases declarations made by the
grantor before, contemporaneously, and subsequent to the alleged gift are admissible-though the statements be self-serving.
(Sprag~te v. Walton, 145 Cal. 228 [78 Pac. 645].) In alienation of affections cases declarations of an alienated spouse
subsequent to the defendant's alleged tortious acts are admissible as evidence of the spouse's state of mind. '(Adkins v.
Brett, 184 Cal. 252 [193 Pac. 251] ; Cripe v. Cripe, 170 Cal. 91
[148 Pac. 520].)
[lb] The intention of the parties is a material element in
determining whether there has been a reconciliation, between
husband and wife. (Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36 [255 Pac.
800] ; Estate of Clover, 179 CaL 313 [176 Pac. 452];Ruggl~s v.
Bailey, 15 Cal. App. (2d) 555 [59 P. (2d) 837]; Gump v.
~ Gump,42 Cal. App. (2d) 64 [108 P. (2d) 21].) Declarations
made by a husband before an alleged dateofre.conciliation
are admissible ag bearing upon his state of mind and the
probability of such reconciliation. (Estate of Clover, supra).
In accordance with the principles set forth, in the foregoing
cases, declarations made by him a few days after'the 8neged
reconciliation hag taken place are likewise admissible.
The case of Carter v. Younger, 123 Ark. 266 [185S. W.
435], which is contrary to the position here taken, was not
approved in Estate of Clover, supra, as appellant contends.
The Clover case involved declarations made before and not
after an alleged date of reconciliation and the Carter case
was simply distinguished on that ground.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Ward,
J., pro tem., concurred.
Carter, J., did not participate herein.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 6,
1942. Carter, J., did not participate therein.

